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This article seeks to assess the need for a macroprudential policy pillar and the degree to which 
progress has been made in instituting one, viewed in the light of lessons learnt in the field of financial 
stability over the past decade. During this period there have been numerous crises, coinciding with 
considerable research and developments in policy and culminating in the lessons of the current crisis. A 
major impetus to these have been a growing realisation of the costs of crises, which can exceed 20% of 
GDP, and the link of such crises to shared exposure to macroeconomic risks and not simply the failure of 
a single large institution. A key policy development has been Macroprudential Surveillance, although as 
highlighted, there remain some unanswered questions as to its use in practice in full–blown 
Macroprudential Regulation. 
Keywords: financial stability, crises, macroeconomic risks, macroprudential regulation, 
macroprudential policy. 
 
The recent financial crisis has prompted a close focus on the causes of financial instability as well as 
the issue of whether it can be prevented. There is a growing realisation that the Sub–Prime crisis, 
although having some important unique features, also had a number of generic aspects in common with 
earlier financial crises, of which a large number have been seen in recent decades. Accordingly, the crisis 
has prompted a debate about macroprudential policy, which focuses on the financial system as a whole, 
treating aggregate risk as endogenous with regard to collective behaviour of institutions. Our survey 
shows that a great deal of progress has been made in 'macroprudential surveillance' and related research 
on causes and predictors of crises. Much less progress has been made in 'macroprudential regulation', the 
design and implementation of policies to prevent or mitigate threatened crises. 
Governments have long sought to regulate financial institutions to ensure that they are safe, sound, and 
able to honor their obligations – especially institutions like commercial banks that collect funds from the 
general public. But the global financial crisis demonstrated that traditional regulation, often called 
microprudential, is insufficient to guarantee the health of the financial system as a whole. 
Traditional regulation tends to be light on institutions like investment banks that operate primarily in 
wholesale markets, where the potential for losses faced by retail depositors is less. Moreover, 
microprudential policy conceives of the stability of the financial system as the sum of individual sound 
institutions. It does not take into account that what constitutes prudent behavior from the point of view of 
one institution may create broad problems when all institutions engage in similar behavior – whether by 
selling questionable assets, tightening credit standards, or holding onto cash. Microprudential regulation 
also does not typically recognize that institutions can be a threat both to other financial institutions and to 
markets, where many large financial firms raise and place funds [2]. 
Because of increasing recognition that traditional regulation allowed financial vulnerabilities to grow 
unchecked, contributing to the global financial crisis, authorities in many countries are exploring a more 
systemic approach to financial regulation. This holistic approach is called macroprudential policy. 
Macroprudential policy does not seek to replace traditional regulation of financial institutions, such as 
commercial banks, which are essential to a healthy system. Instead, it adds to and complements 
microprudential policy. It can often deploy traditional regulatory tools, and relies on traditional regulators 
for implementation and enforcement. Macroprudential policy – a set of preventive measures aimed to 
minimize the risk of a systemic financial crisis, i.e. the risk of a situation in which a significant part of 
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financial market is defined as insolvent or illiquid, causing market participants can not continue to operate 
without the support of the monetary authorities and supervision [3]. 
Unlike macro–prudential supervision, prudential supervision focused on individual banks and their 
risk , paying minimal attention to the activities of the financial sector as a whole [3].  
Macroprudential policies are designed to identify and mitigate risks to systemic stability, in turn 
reducing the cost to the economy from a disruption in financial services that underpin the workings of 
financial markets – such as the provision of credit, but also of insurance and payment and settlement 
services. 
An example of such a disruption is a credit crunch, in which losses suffered by banks and other 
lenders cause a curtailment of credit to households and firms that in turn depresses overall economic 
activity [2]. 
Such disruptions can arise either from the overall, or aggregate, weakness of the financial sector or 
from the failure of so–called systemic individual institutions—which are large and have financial 
relationships with many other institutions. 
The failure of an individual institution can create systemic risk when it impairs the ability of other 
institutions to continue to provide financial services to the economy. Usually only a large institution that 
is heavily connected to many other institutions can cause such spillovers that its failure threatens systemic 
stability.  
These spillovers can occur through one or more of four channels of contagion [4]: 
 direct exposure of other financial institutions to the stricken institution;  
 fire sales of assets by the stricken institution that cause the value of all similar assets to decline, 
forcing other institutions to take losses on the assets they hold;  
 reliance of other financial institutions on the continued provision of financial services, such as 
credit, insurance, and payment services, by the stricken institution; 
 increases in funding costs and runs on other institutions in the wake of the failure of the systemic 
institution. 
For macroprudential policy to be able to reduce the expected cost both of aggregate weakness and of 
disruption through failure of individual systemic institutions it must bring within its purview two sets of 
firms—systemic institutions and all leveraged credit providers (those that lend borrowed funds) [3].  
Systemic institutions include not only large banks, but also those that provide critical payment and 
insurance services to other financial institutions.  
All leveraged providers of credit, regardless of size, are included in the purview of macroprudential 
policy because it is their collective weakness that can affect the provision of credit to the economy as a 
whole. Although banks are almost always the most important leveraged providers of credit, in some 
jurisdictions important classes of nonbank lenders must also be within the scope of macroprudential 
policy. Otherwise there is a risk that the provision of credit will migrate from banks to less–constrained 
nonbanks (Table). 
Thus, macroprudential policy is different from the micro–prudential supervision in the analysis of the 
stability of the financial market, which takes place at the aggregate level rather than at the level of 
individual financial institutions; taken into account all the financial markets, not just banks; analyzed the 
relationship between systemoutovryuyuchymy financial institutions, medium–sized and small to avoid 
the situation the effect of "dominoes". 
Macroprudential policy must deploy a range of tools to address aggregate weakness and individual 
failures. Because a single tool is unlikely to be sufficient to address the various sources of systemic risk, 
the macroprudential authority must be able to tailor specific macroprudential instruments to the particular 
vulnerabilities identified by its analysis. 
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Table – Differences between microprudentia and macroprudential regulation [1] 
 
Characteristic Microprudential regulation Macroprudential regulation 
Final target Reducing the costs of financial 
instability 
Protect the interests of depositors 
and creditors of banks 
Intermediate target Maintaining financial stability in 
general 
Preventing problems in certain 
financial institutions 
Risk model in the financial 
sector 
External risks Internal risks 
Prospects estimation A probabilistic approach based on 
risk assessment, focus on scenario 
analysis 
The approach is based on an 
analysis of the formal reporting, 
emphasis on internal controls and 
audits 
Determination of prudential 
norms 
The approach of "top down": 
tracking system of financial market 
shocks 
The approach of "top down": 
tracking individual market 
participants 
Information disclosure Wide distribution of evaluation 
results including indicators of 
financial stability, macroprudential 
indicators, early warning signal 
models 
Standardized reports and 
confidential information 
 
Depending on the specific objectives of macroprudential regulation chosen set of parameters. The 
European Central Bank identifies three categories , namely [4]:  
1) the stability of the banking system indicators ( debt dynamics, competitive conditions, liquidity, 
risk concentration, asset quality, profitability, availability of capital buffers, the assessment of the market) 
; 
2) macroeconomic factors affecting the banking system (level of income, leverage, debt rates , asset 
prices , monetary policy and external position of the country and / or the EU ); 
3) factors sensitivity to shocks in other sectors, countries, regions. 
Though the level of harmonization of standards within the EU is high, the ability to compare the 
indicators among union members is complicated by differences in accounting standards and redundancy 
[3]. 
Since 2011, the European Union is building a European system of financial supervision, which 
includes regulators of individual segments of the financial sector (Fig. 1)  
 
Fig. 1 – Scheme of European financial  supervision system 
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The last of the agencies was created European Systemic Risk Board, which has the following 
functions: identification, assessment and reduction of vulnerability arising from the interdependence of 
elements of the financial market, and macroeconomic and structural change. It is believed that the main 
advantage of the new regulator will be able to quickly adapt and flexibility of response. 
The legal basis for macro–prudential regulation in the United States at present is the Dodd– Frank Act 
, signed July 21, 2010 According to this legislation was created macroprudential authority – the Board of 
supervision of financial stability, which has broad powers to determine and monitor excessive risk in the 
financial system U.S. may be caused by the deterioration of the financial condition or bankruptcy of large 
banks, bank holding companies and / or non–bank institutions , or external factors, and response to threats 
to the financial stability of the United States [2].  
Board of supervision of financial stability deals with identifying systemically important institutions to 
develop them more stringent standards, enhanced monitoring, restructuring and eliminating those that 
carry risks for the entire system [3]. 
At the same time strengthening the macroprudential concept is in other financial sector regulatory 
bodies.  
 
Fig. 2 – Model of macroprudential regulation in the U.S. 
 
China is building a system of macro–prudential regulation of the banking system, including working 
to develop a mechanism for collecting and analyzing macro–prudential indicators, which runs parallel 
with the transition to international accounting and auditing standards and improve the classification of 
financial institutions. The structure of financial regulation remains unchanged from 2004 (Fig. 3.), But 
expanding range of issues in connection with a focus on macro and systemic risk.  
Currently for macroprudential analysis regulators mikroprudentsiyni China uses the following 
indicators: overall performance of institutions that reflect the dynamics of assets, loans and deposits, 
safety indicators (capital adequacy, asset quality, concentration of loan portfolio), liquidity and 
profitability. 
Theme of macroprudential approach is also actual for Ukraine. Since the national banking system 
continues to develop it is particularly exposed to market risk and liquidity risk. Assessment of systemic 
risk and macroprudential regulation is not implemented in Ukraine at the appropriate level [3].  
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Fig. 3 – The system of macro–prudential regulation in China 
 
We believe that a partial analogue of such activities are calculation of macroeconomic stress tests and 
some metadata financial soundness indicators, which are summarized by the National Bank in the 
framework of the assessment of the stability of the financial sector under the authority of the IMF and the 
World Bank. In my view, the history of banking regulation and supervision indicates a low probability of 
a single body that would be responsible for the stability of the banking system. A more important problem 
is to establish promptly relationship with macroprudential issues between the National Bank of Ukraine, 
State Commission for Regulation of Financial Services Markets of Ukraine and the National Comission 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission [1, p.7].  
To our opinion using world experience modeling system to ensure financial stability of the banking 
system in Ukraine, responsible for macro–prudential regulation should be a specialized department of the 
NBU, which would consist of experts from various fields to explore all the major manifestations of 
systemic risk. One of the priorities is to develop a set of indicators that allow to prevent violations of 
resistance at the level of individual banks , and at the system as a whole , paying special attention 
systemically important institutions (Fig. 4).  
 
Fig. 4 – The system of macro–prudential regulation in Ukraine 
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The independent central bank should play an important role in all arrangements. Not only do central 
banks have expertise in risk assessment, but as lenders of last resort to institutions facing liquidity 
problems, central banks are motivated to take timely action to reduce the buildup of risks. Moreover, a 
strong role for the central bank allows coordination with monetary policy, which sets the overall 
conditions that affect the demand for and supply of credit. Participation by the government is useful to 
ensure the support of tax policy and to facilitate legislative changes that may be needed to enable the 
authorities to mitigate systemic risk, such as the creation of regulatory authority over nonbank lenders and 
other systemic institutions. But because of the political nature of government, a strong role can pose risks 
because governments have incentives to oppose taking macroprudential measures in good times, when 
they are often most needed [1, p.8]. 
But even the best macroprudential policies cannot prevent all financial crises. As a result, there is a 
need for a strong and flexible lender of last resort—typically a central bank—to ease temporary shortages 
in liquidity and for credible policies to resolve or close failing financial institutions. Moreover, 
macroprudential policy does not operate in a vacuum. Sound monetary, taxing, and spending policies are 
essential to creating a stable environment conducive to a healthy financial system. 
 
Список использованных источников: 
1. Каурова Н. Н. Макропруденциальное регулирование финансовых рынков / Н. Н. Каурова // Финансо-
вый журнал. – 2012. – № 1. – С. 6–18. 
2. Abrams, Richard K., and Michael Taylor. Issues in the Unification of Financial Sector Supervision. MAE 
Operational Pa per, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. 2000. 
3. Aligning Financial Supervisory Structures with Country Needs [Text]: / Ed. By J.Carmichael et al. – 
Washington: Wold Bank Institute, 2004.]. 
4. Demirguc–Kunt A., Detragiache E. Cross–Country Empirical Studies of Systematic Bank Distress: A Survey. 
IMF WP, 2005. 
 
 
УДК 336  
KNOWLEDGE IMPACT ON INVESTMENT ACTIVITY RESULTS 
 
Dubinskas Petras Petras, лектор, petras@tiscali.it 
Mecejiene Gitana Petras, лектор, g.mecejiene@gmail.com 
Вильнюсская коллегия, Литва 
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Capital market participants and its theorists are leading active discussions when trying to identify the 
factors determining the investment success. What determines the investment success? According to the 
efficient market hypothesis, the investment success is more or less determined by the coincidence factor, 
since prices of financial instruments (e.g., shares) are subject to random walks [3, p. 49].  However, 
significant decline of the capital market and price bubbles that emerge at least once per decade raise 
concern whether the efficient market hypothesis can explain these changes and the reasons of investment 
results [1, p. 16].  The aforementioned factors led to the emergence of the theory  of behavioural finance 
based on the ideas of Kahneman and Tversky (psychologists) that state that investment results are 
determined by characteristic traits of an investor and various psychological factors rather than 
coincidences and rational decisions [4, p. 237]. In fact, the investor's knowledge should have an important 
impact on the investment results, since decisions are frequently made considering the accumulated 
knowledge, i.e., choices are made out of several alternatives. This is key statement of our hypothesis.   
The research objective is to evaluate the relationship between logical and financial knowledge and 
investment results. To implement this objective the following tasks were set up: a) to specify the 
methodology aimed at determining the relationship between the knowledge and investment results; b) to 
evaluate the relationship between the knowledge and investment results through the application of 
correlation and regression analysis.  
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